I Researched if Flock Cameras were Legal… then they Installed One at my Driveway

Okay, here's the deal. As the title of this video implies, I began researching the constitutionality of Flock cameras, which are now being installed at a mind-boggling pace in America. And after just 3 days of heavy research on the open internet, I woke up one morning and lo and behold, a Flock technician was installing one just a few hundred feet from my driveway pointing directly at my driveway. I'm not kidding. I blurred all of the footage around the camera because this thing is directly in front of my house and you know, normal people expect normal amounts of privacy. And I'm I'm not going to assume that a surveillance camera was installed pointing at my driveway directly because I began heavily researching whether or not those surveillance cameras were constitutional. Ladies and gentlemen, we got them. But the fact that this thought is even within the realm of possibility at all is exactly why America is so concerned about these cameras. At the Flock at a Troy, thank you very much. So in this episode, let's just answer the dang questions. What are these cameras? What do they do? And are they a direct violation of our Fourth Amendment right to privacy? Who is your daddy and what does he do? I'm Jake the lawyer and welcome back to Internet Esquire. All right, so you may have seen videos floating around the internet recently that deep dive into the controversy around these cameras. I mean, there's a ton of them. Today, we're going to spy on Flock employees to see how they like being under surveillance. And that's probably because over 115,000 of them have been installed in America in less than 2 years. And the accusation is simple. A private company is using your tax dollars to install the infrastructure for a nationwide mass surveillance system. A system that will not only track your everyday movements and violate your constitutional right to privacy, but will usher in other more dystopian designs like social credit score systems and worse. Now as good, honest Americans with a healthy distrust of governments big and small, [music] that's obviously something we should be concerned about. But, it's often hard from these investigative videos to get an actual sense of what's really happening. Can a private company create a mass surveillance system? Is that legal? And is that even what's really happening or is this entire thing being blown completely out of proportion? WILL SOMEONE PLEASE EXPLAIN TO ME WHAT THE HELL IS GOING ON? OKAY, let's just start at the beginning. Flock Safety Inc., doing business as Flock [music] Safety, is a private American company founded in 2017 by Matt Fury, Paige Todd, and CEO Garrett Langley, who recently called deflock.org a terrorist organization. There's terroristic organizations like deflock, whose primary motivation is chaos. Now, to be fair, he did apologize for this later, but only after guys like Ben Johnson and Tommy G got millions of views when they started actually digging into the company. Either way, calling a crowdsource project that uses public information to map Flock cameras a terrorist organization is a pretty wild mindset to have for a company that claims everything it does is constitutional because it comes from public information. All things that are public information in the plain view. Anyways, if you haven't figured it out by now, Flock makes surveillance cameras and the software that supports them. But, that's like the only simple part about any of this. And of course, what most people are referring to when they say Flock cameras today are Flock's automated license plate reader cameras, otherwise known as ALPRs or just LPRs. These are the ones that have been popping up everywhere. Now, here's the thing about these cameras. Anyone can get one. I mean, literally anyone. I mean, you could get one and point it facing at your driveway if you want to do. That'd be fun. Oh, I don't know if I'm home yet. I better check. He knows if you've been bad or good. So be good for goodness sake. Anyway, here's how these Flock cameras work. They capture a still image of virtually every vehicle that passes by by recording the license plate time and location and then log the plate number and use additional AI analysis to create a more robust profile of the vehicle based on identifying characteristics like a roof rack or a bumper sticker. The Flock system then places that information into a searchable database which is ordinarily set for about 30 days but can be set for almost literally any amount of time. So if it does all of that, who then would be likely to purchase all of these cameras? Well, unsurprisingly, their biggest customers are things like law enforcement agencies, city governments, and other large real estate holders like homeowners associations, commercial developments, universities, schools, churches, and places like that. So now, knowing that, let's answer the first big question. Is any of this basic technology and the use as described by Flock constitutional in the first place? Okay, are LPRs legal? Well, the general answer is yes, license plate readers are legal. But there is a very specific context to their use that Flock seems to be hell-bent on pushing the boundaries on. And we're going to talk about all that soon, but for now, just think of it like this. Anyone can generally photograph anything that is happening on a public roadway so long as a few basic things are kept in mind. They're in a place where they're legally allowed to be and they are observing information that is regularly exposed to public view, which is a very legalistic way of saying things in the street can be filmed, but keep this in mind. When law enforcement does this or when the government or any governmental agent does this, something else comes into play, the Fourth Amendment. And the Fourth Amendment says this about the right to privacy. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. Don't worry if that doesn't make sense to you, okay? I'm right here. The point is, well, the words the right to privacy do not expressly of the language of the Fourth Amendment, that is really just legal shorthand for the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and unjustified government intrusion. Now, originally this right to privacy was closely connected to actual physical property and it was designed to prevent the government from entering your home, seizing your belongings, or taking you and your loved ones off to jail without probable cause. But, as new technology continued to reveal more and more about everyday American life, beginning in the mid-20th century, the Supreme Court began to recognize that this physical protection of property also extended to government searches in the digital realm. And the first case to do this was in 1967 in a case called Katz versus United States. A man named Charles Katz was using a public telephone booth to transmit illegal gambling information. And so, what the FBI did is they placed a listening device on the outside of the telephone booth. And while Katz was inside of the telephone booth blabbing away about whatever illegal gambling tips he had, the FBI heard the entire conversation. They obviously then used this information to prosecute him. And when this came up in court, the government argued that they did not commit a Fourth Amendment search without a warrant because they had not physically entered the phone booth and the fact that the phone booth was on a public sidewalk. And while the court held that what a person knowingly exposes to public view is not protected by the Fourth Amendment, they found the listening device to be unconstitutional saying this, "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Meaning a government action can be an illegal search even if it doesn't involve physical trespass and even if it happens in a public place through what is known as the reasonable expectation of privacy test. Here's how that works. Whether someone A, actually sought to keep something private and B, that expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable, is more important than the place where the search occurred. As a result, things can be protected from unwarranted government intrusion even if those things happen in public. So now, let's take this back to Flock. They claim that every individual camera just takes individual pictures of license plates and that there's nothing wrong or unconstitutional about any of that. ALPRs do not violate the Fourth Amendment or any other constitutional provision. Well, yes. That is true. Mhm. But there is way more going on here than they're actually letting on in these videos. And we're going to get into all of that in a minute when we begin to talk about the Mosaic problem. But for now, let's just continue to work the problem. If someone seeks to preserve something as private and that expectation is deemed reasonable by society, that thing can be constitutionally protected from unwarranted government searches, even if that search occurred in public. That was the fundamental legal finding of Katz. So, is it reasonable to have an expectation of privacy in your license plate when you're on a public road? No, it's not. Beginning in 1983 with the Supreme Court case of United States versus Knotts, the court found that a person traveling on public roads has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle's movements because the routine direction stops and destination are visible to anyone watching. And then, in United States versus Porter in just March of this year, the federal Fifth Circuit applied that logic and held that police did not conduct a Fourth Amendment search by searching license plate reader records which showed a vehicle of interest at several points along a public road. So, Flock is not entirely wrong in this very narrow interpretation of what their cameras do. And this is also not uncommon for how criminal investigations use LPRs today. But, don't take my word for it. Here is Buffalo Police Special Victims Unit Detective Richard High to explain a little bit more how LPRs are used every day by law enforcement. For law enforcement, when we use the LPRs in order to like find vehicles that are have a registration that's been expired, you know, for like vehicle and traffic law. You know, you the cop car turns around, you know, puts its lights on and said, "Hey, the LPR hit and said that your license is suspended or the vehicle registration suspended." That's one way. The other way is we save that data. So, let me say that Axon, everybody knows Axon's a body cam company. We use Axon. We previously didn't. But, even then, the license plate readers that we had stationary throughout the city and attached to vehicles still saved the data for a long period of time and we could look and say hey this car recently was involved in a shooting. Let's run the plate and see where it comes back to previously and then you can see like how and where it would park and where it would be when it would hit those license plate readers, right? If it's a patrol vehicle that's moving around, it would say oh it's parked in front of this address a whole bunch. We can assume that that's a person that lives there and then you gather more information from like uh your electrical or gas company or you say hey this is where it was driving. We now know that it was at this scene during these times possibly stalking somebody or we know it came from this general direction. So the data saved the data bank on license plates that have been read by LPRs has already been out there. Now they may not talk to one another, you know like Flock is an is a company Axon is a company and the other previous ones that we used is another company. Sometimes they don't mesh. Now I believe Flock might be getting rid of that and meshing with everybody so everybody can kind of collect data together. Right you are Detective High, right you are. And if you'd like to see an exclusive show available only on pepperbox.tv called awful and unlawful where Detective High and I review incidents of criminality along with our friend Nolan from the Man vs. Morning podcast or you just want to watch all of these YouTube videos over there but without ads, check out the link in the description below to get started with a 14-day free trial. Oh I like that. Yeah, me too. The first episode of awful and unlawful is going to drop next week and there are already hundreds of exclusive episodes available over there right now that you can't find on YouTube. Either way, it's a great way to support this channel and to take part in a great community. So consider jumping on over there if you're interested, otherwise all of my regular internet Esquire videos will be available here on YouTube with ads, or over on Pepper Box. Anyway, as Detective High stated and the Fifth Circuit Court reiterated in the case of Porter, LPR cameras are permitted as constitutional so long as they are intermittent public observations. Intermittent public observations. Intermittent. It's a word that matters. Mhm. And it's important because it is the opposite of continuous mass surveillance tracking of the everyday movements of innocent American people. Because there are constitutional limitations to public observation, and this is something that Flock does not want you to know about, and often times law enforcement can also get wrong. The idea that there is no expectation of privacy in public is not true at all. You still have a Fourth Amendment right to privacy in public so long as your expectation of that privacy is something that society would deem as objectively reasonable. And granted, while that is a bit of a slippery definition, it is within this exact definition that the situation with Flock becomes way more complicated. Now, increasingly since the company began, Flock technology is not just simply designed to provide intermittent information inside of a closed system. It is designed to mesh information, not just with other Flock cameras, but with entirely other surveillance and police information systems. In fact, Flock's broader platform, Flock OS, is directly marketed as the connective layer for real-time crime centers. And according to Flock, this system can place the following information into one common operating system and map: license plate alerts, live and recorded video, third-party camera feeds, gunshot detectors, which we all know are just microphones that are actively listening, drones, computer-aided dispatch information, vehicle location information, and more. And this creates something wholly different than just a single LPR camera on a random public roadway. Imagine it this way. Imagine that LPR is connected with hundreds or even thousands of other LPR cameras. Now, imagine those are all connected with drones, audio sensors, police dispatch, and more, and it's all integrated into one easy system inside of a Flock operating system. Now, add in a sprinkling of facial recognition, and voila, that is something entirely different than what we're talking about with LPRs. It is a virtually continuous, comprehensive, mass surveillance tracking system capable of violating some of the most basic concepts of privacy that society itself would easily recognize as objectively reasonable. And that, my friends, is what we call the mosaic problem. The idea that many small pieces of surveillance data, each seemingly harmless on its own, can be combined to reveal a detailed picture of someone's life that no ordinary observer could realistically obtain, even if every law enforcement and government agent in the area was looking into it. A place where the whole surveillance record becomes constitutionally different from the sum of its individual parts, where hundreds or thousands of scans over time reveal where you work, where you worship, where you live, who you sleep with, where you travel, and where you take a dump. Where beautiful women instinctively flock like the salmon of Capistrano. Sorry, my my point is if this were the case, does any of this sound honest to you? There's a common misconception that Flock tracks you wherever you go. And that's just not the case. Now, you might say, "Well, that's not the case, Jake, so that's why none of that sounds honest to you." But let me tell you a little story. Here's the funny thing about the mosaic problem. It first occurred in legal reasoning when the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not the CIA was required to disclose the names of researchers who had participated in the MK-Ultra program. Yeah, no, we're not doing that. We're not using fog cameras as a mass surveillance system. No. MK-Ultra, the Tuskegee experiments, no, we we're not doing that anymore. Yes, and look, I'm not going to get too deep into what the MK-Ultra program was, but just know that it was a mind control program developed by the CIA during the Cold War that involved large amounts of LSD and drugging innocent people. Mind control, LSD, Charles Manson. I'm not kidding. But we're not doing that anymore. Got it. They said it. I don't know why you're still here. They said that they're not doing it anymore, so it's probably not happening anymore. We're not using labs in other countries to engage in gain of function research. No. Why would you think that? It was a bat. Anyway, the 1985 case of CIA versus Sims requested the names of the researchers under a Freedom of Information Act request, and of course, unsurprisingly, the CIA refused and ran to the Supreme Court for an opinion. And the court reasoned that the CIA did not only not have to disclose the names of the researchers, but also didn't have to disclose things like the names of the universities where they worked or the names of the laboratories where they worked. Because well, those individual pieces of information might seemingly be harmless, they could be combined by a foreign intelligence agency with other publicly available pieces of information to accurately identify the names of the researchers. No way. That's crazy. So, you could take a bunch of individual pieces of information that seem harmless on their own and combine them to get a more complete picture of something else that's happening. Huh, insane. I mean, and of course, if it's a foreign intelligence agency, yeah, we don't want them getting a hold of that information. That would be potentially dangerous. But wait. What if it's our own government? But what if he shot you in the face? What if he shot me in the face? That's the risk we were willing to take. Fortunately, in more recent cases, courts have begun to recognize the obvious risks that a mosaic of information poses to the right of privacy in the digital age. In the case of United States versus Maynard in 2010, the DC Circuit Court said that although each individual moment of a car on a public roadway was exposed to the public, obviously, 28 days of GPS tracking data revealed a picture about movements that no ordinary observer could realistically obtain. Then in 2012, in the Supreme Court case of United States versus Jones, they held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle without a warrant constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And well, the government tried to argue in Jones that a driver has no reasonable expectation of privacy to the movements of their vehicle because they are exposed to public view on a public road, Justice Scalia writing for the majority held that whenever the government intrudes upon a protected person, house, paper, or effects to obtain information, it constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Good. Good. I'm I'm glad we had to re-discover that 235 years after the Fourth Amendment was written. Good. Yeah, every now and then it's just good good reminder. The government be like, "Hey, is is that still a thing? Ah. Dang it. And look, while the holding in Jones was somewhat limited because it involved both physical trespass and digital trespass, it set the court up to decide that unanswered question, which they did 6 years later in the case of Carpenter versus United States in 2018. In Carpenter, police obtained a detailed history of a suspect's movements from his cell phone without first getting a warrant based on probable cause. And of course, most people know this now, but whenever a cell phone communicates with a cell tower by making calls, sending messages, or using data, it connects with nearby towers. The cell phone carrier then keeps records of which towers handled those communications. And while those records do not provide a precise GPS coordinate, they can place the phone within a given area and show how it moved over time. And this is exactly what happened in Carpenter. The government used over 13,000 location points captured over 127 days to place the defendant's phone near several robberies. Well, obviously, the defendant argued that such a detailed record of his movements constituted a Fourth Amendment violation because it had been obtained without a warrant and was now being used against him in court. But the government relied heavily on what is known as the third-party doctrine to justify its actions, which says that a person generally lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy when their information is voluntarily disclosed to a third party. And in a five-four decision, the court held that the use of the records constituted a Fourth Amendment search with the central principle being that a person maintains a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy within the whole of their movements even though each individual movement happened in public. Impressive. Very nice. Huh. Kind of like if, you know, hundreds or thousands of data points taken by Flock cameras were then organized through their infrastructure to create a mosaic of somebody's everyday regular movements. Yeah. Yeah, I suppose it could be just like that. The court in Carpenter also took a direct look at the third-party doctrine, which is something that Flock contends is part of their just and fair business practices. There's a concern that federal agencies have secret access to Flock data. Every one of Flock's clients control access to their data. This is one of Flock's biggest arguments to say that they're in favor of privacy and not doing anything unconstitutional. Look, guys, like it's fine. Our customers get to choose what they do with their data. We don't we don't do anything, okay? We're just the middleman. There's a common misconception that Flock shares data on behalf of our customers. The reality is we will always have customers be in control of their data. But also, interestingly, Flock technology is specifically desired because of its shareability functions to the point that what makes Flock more valuable than other LPR and surveillance systems out there is specifically this sharing and mesh functionality. So, they hide behind the argument that they don't control the data while providing a system that is specifically valuable because of the way the data can be shared. Got it. Dope. Hell yeah. This guy The nice thing for us hoi polloi is that in the Carpenter case, the court dealt with this idea. First, the majority held that just carrying a cell phone was an indispensable part of participating in everyday society. You know, kind of like driving a car on a public roadway. Eh. It's fine. Don't worry about that one. That's still a privilege. And second, they held that the cell phone user does not meaningfully choose to transmit data to the cell phone provider every time they send a message and connect to a tower. Instead, the data is automatically generated as part of the phone's normal function. Thus, the defendant in Carpenter had not voluntarily exposed his movements in the same straightforward way that you would voluntarily give over financial information, say, if you were trying to get a bank loan. And the mere fact that a company possesses sensitive information, or that that information occurred in public, does not destroy every Fourth Amendment protection. Okay. Now, let's [music] take all of this and add one more case on top of it, a case that Flock has directly responded to, Shattery versus United States, which was decided on June 29th of this year and is the Supreme Court's latest major digital location decision. Here's what happened. In 2019, a man named Okello Shattery robbed a credit union in Virginia, but the problem for investigators was that they had surveillance footage and witness accounts, but they could not identify the robber. So, seeking to uncover the true identity of this future doctor, police asked Google to identify every device that appeared near the bank around a 2-hour window when the robbery took place in what is otherwise known as a geofence warrant. And the way that a geofence warrant works is basically exactly the opposite of the way that a traditional warrant works. Instead of asking Google for information about a named suspect, police draw a virtual boundary around a location and demand information identifying every device recorded within that boundary during the specified time. Google, in this case, then searches its database and provides to police an anonymous list of the devices captured within that geofence. Police then examine those devices, request additional information, and remove the unsuspecting ones until they've narrowed it down. At which point they go back to Google and ask them to reveal the names, emails, and other data associated with the device. Now, obviously this creates a constitutional problem. Instead of "No warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched," a geofence warrant begins with a completely unparticular general search of everyone inside of the fence. And while that information is provided anonymously, police then search through all of that information, eliminating the ones that don't seem to be suspicious until they've finally narrowed it down to a particular device or a few particular devices. Now, this brings up an entirely different practical question, which is how do you go through someone's phone and not find out who they are by all of the information that's in there, but we'll just set that one aside for now. Either way, a geofence warrant in turn produces three major objections under the Fourth Amendment. First, probable cause. Being near a crime scene does not establish probable cause to say that every cell phone contains evidence of that crime. Second, particularity. Well, I mean, nothing about this is particular at all. You're literally grabbing all of the phones within a geofence area, and you're searching through those. And third, just a general violation of the right to privacy, you know, to be free from unwarranted government intrusion. Being in the wrong place at the wrong time does not justify government intrusion without probable cause. Anyway, in the case of Shattery, well, they eventually found the guy guilty of the robbery and gave him 141 months in prison because, well, screw that guy, the issue of geofencing came up in a major way. And well, the court did not specifically hold that all geofencing is unconstitutional, they did specifically hold that geofencing is a search under the Fourth Amendment. And this reinforced the Carpenter decision from 2018, which held that people do have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their movements, even if those movements occurred in public. And that digital information does not automatically lose constitutional protection merely by virtue of the fact that it is held by a third party. The hilarious thing about the Shatry decision though, was that Flock tried to spin it as quote, "Reaffirming that people do not have an expectation of privacy on public roads." Wow. Oh, oh, oh, and this. And that ALPR systems are a clear distinction from comprehensive digital location tracking. Sure. Yeah. Yeah, let's go with that. But here's why this is a win if you're skeptical about Flock cameras because anytime major companies or politicians start saying something that is exactly the opposite of the truth, you know you're getting close. No, the Shatry decision did not reaffirm the idea that people do not have an expectation of privacy on public roads. And that's why they had to add this little bit at the end. In the same way that they do in private spaces. Oh, oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. Look, look. Of course, of course, everybody recognizes that you don't have the same expectation of privacy on public roads as you do in your home. Of course, that's that's all we're saying. That's all we're saying. That's all we're saying. And of course, given that that is what we're saying, it it it it also reinforces the legal principles that have guided ALPR decisions for years. Yeah, guys, it's fine. This has been going on for years. That makes it totally okay. Totally okay if something has been going on for years for that means that it's okay. I don't know if you know that. But that's how it works. The longer you do it for, the the the the more okay it becomes. And did it support ALPRs as a clear distinction from digital location tracking? No. Instead, it reaffirmed the idea that if the mosaic of information becomes too comprehensive, then it will also fall under the Fourth Amendment when it is used to search. So, are Flock cameras constitutional? For now, yes. Flock is skirting by as constitutional because they are holding on to the idea that they're just another LPR system for dear life like Tom Cruise on that airplane. [music] But at the same time they are doing this. They are literally building the infrastructure for a digital mosaic of information made up of innocent data points that in reality construct such a detailed insight into a person's life that no ordinary observer could realistically obtain it, which obviously is unconstitutional for law enforcement to search through without probable cause and a valid warrant. And they're hiding behind the idea that we let customers choose what to do with their data, so they can step back and claim they're not truly responsible for creating the mosaic. Ha, yes, of course. Yeah, I can just imagine their lawyers trying to come up with a theory. Okay, guys, how can we create a mass surveillance system while also saying that we're legally not creating a mass surveillance system? Hmm. This is it. This is the answer. Ha, yes, that's it. It's the data. If we're not actually meshing the data, then we can't be held responsible. If we could somehow harness this lightning. Anyway, unfortunately, because of all of this, the current legal fight is within a constitutional gray area. And look, [music] anytime you're dealing with new technologies that touch upon fundamental principles like the right to privacy, you're you're going to get into situations like this. It's not like America hasn't been here before. But, here's the thing. Flock, if it keeps moving in this direction, might become a victim of its own success. Because the constitutional arguments protecting intermittent license plate reader technology becomes more and more weak the more robust the Flock systems get. One camera is clearly constitutional. 20 cameras paints a little bit different of a picture. But, hundreds or even thousands of cameras that show the entirety of somebody's journey from point A to point B, hmm. And then you combine that with the Flock OS system, which brings in thousands of other data points, well, you start doing that and you now have a comprehensive chronicle that details some of the most intimate things in a person's life even if those things occurred in public. [music] And it is very fair to say that society has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that. And as far as I can tell, the courts have begun to recognize that more and more and more. And well, yes, in April of this year, there was a ruling in the city of Norfolk, Virginia that said that they could put up 172 Flock cameras. The court's ruling was limited to, quote, the existing system as presently configured. That doesn't mean that it's okay for them to set up 200 Flock cameras. I'm just saying courts are starting to look at this and go, yeah. Mhm. I've got it under control. I've sorted it out. We're we're we're good. And here is the ultimate problem for Flock. Their legal justification under the Constitution relies on the idea that their cameras only produce fragments of information, but their commercial success as a company relies entirely on eliminating the gaps between those fragments. Now, the problem with the law is that we won't be able to decide on whether something like that is constitutional until a system like that is already built. And while I agree that current case law suggests that the Supreme Court would find a system like that unconstitutional, it behooves us as citizens to, you know, not let it get that far. Getting out in front of this problem and letting our local governments know that, well, we can respect law and order, placing the right of privacy above safety is the correct constitutional hierarchy. And that LPR cameras can still serve their legitimate function in society without, you know, I don't know, accidentally becoming a nationwide mass surveillance system. And people speaking out about this has been making a difference. I mean, the city of Los Angeles, for example, just, I think, abandoned their program with Flock. That's the video. I hope you enjoyed it, and I hope you learned something. Comment below on other video topics you'd like to see me explore. Flock was a big one that has been brought up in the last 2 weeks, so that's why I decided to do this video. And don't forget to check out pepperbox.tv if you want to get all of these videos without ads and the new exclusive Awful and Unlawful, which will be coming out over there soon. Consider subscribing if you've seen more than one of these videos and enjoyed it. And now I have to go figure out when the next public county meeting is to see what the hell is going on with that camera in my driveway. Awesome. All right, have a have a wonderful day. See you on on next one. Did you like the microphone that I installed? Hopefully, you did. Let me know. Okay, so look, I know that they're just using my search history to give me this message, but I noticed you were checking out our blog on ALPR technology. Saw that you're interested in what the Supreme Court Chat re decision means for ALPR technology. Yeah, we're available if you have any questions or want to talk more. Yeah, we're just going to put a camera in front of your driveway and we'll be there if you have any questions. Uh-huh. Sure.